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The Special Prosecutor Act: Proposals
For 1983
Victor H. Kramer* and Louis P. Smith**
I. INTRODUCTION
The special prosecutor provisions of the Ethics in Govern-
ment Act were enacted by Congress in October 1978.1 The Act
contains a sunset clause that terminates the provisions in Octo-
ber 1983.2 Congress is now considering how the special prose-
cutor provisions have been interpreted and applied to
determine whether it should allow the Act to expire, to con-
tinue in its present form, or to continue with appropriate
changes.
Congress adopted the Act in the wake of Watergate, after
extensive public debate and more than five years of legislative
hearings.3 In an attempt to ensure the effectiveness of the spe-
cial prosecutor,4 Congress created an office independent of the
Attorney General. Under the Act, if the Attorney General un-
covers nonfrivolous allegations that the President, the Vice
President, a member of the Cabinet, or any of certain other
government officials has committed a federal crime other than
a petty misdemeanor, the Attorney General must petition a
special three-judge court to appoint a special prosecutor to in-
vestigate these charges.
This Article reviews the genesis of the Act and how the law
has worked under three Attorneys General. It questions both
* Law Alumni Professor, University of Minnesota Law School, 1981-82.
** J.D. Candidate, University of Minnesota, 1983.
1. Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, tit. VI, § 601(a), 92
Stat. 1824, 1867.
2. 28 U.S.C. § 598 (Supp. HI 1979).
3. Congressional debate over the need for a special prosecutor began in
May 1973. See Hearings on the Nomination of Elliot L. Richardson to be Attor-
ney Genera" Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
143-225 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on Elliot L. Richardson]. Special
prosecutor legislation was introduced in and considered by the 93d, 94th, and
95th Congresses, and finally adopted in October, 1978. See supra note 1. See
also infra text accompanying notes 9-29.
4. For a discussion of Congress's motives, see infra text accompanying
notes 9-29.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
the fairness of the special prosecutor procedures and the con-
stitutionality of the Act.5 The Article discusses problems with
the Act during its short history,6 and examines several alterna-
tive ways to structure the office of a special prosecutor. Finally,
the authors detail a proposal which Congress may wish to con-
sider in its deliberations.7
II. HISTORY OF THE ACT
Congress began to call for an independent special prosecu-
tor as the Watergate controversy was nearing its climax.8 The
Senate Judiciary Committee considered the need for a special
prosecutor as early as the spring of 1973,9 and the judiciary
committees of both houses of the 93d Congress held extensive
hearings on the subject.1o In the spring of 1974, a subcommittee
of the Senate Judiciary Committee, chaired by Senator Ervin,
considered proposals to establish a permanent "special" or
"public" prosecutor." In June 1974, a Senate Select Committee
recommended establishment of a permanent office, independ-
ent of the President, to prosecute criminal cases involving high
government officials and others.12
Following President Nixon's resignation in August 1974,
Congress began to study the problem in the calmer atmosphere
5. Attorney General Smith, see infra note 64, and former Attorney Gen-
eral Civiletti have raised such questions. See N.Y. TiMEs, Dec. 7, 1980, § 1, at 44,
col. 1 (former Attorney General Civiletti expresses "substantial doubt about
the basic fairness of the Special Prosecutor Act").
6. See infra text accompanying notes 48-122.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 157-97. An appendix to this Article
sets out the changes the proposal suggests in the present Act.
8. A Watergate special prosecutor, Archibald Cox, had been appointed
previously. The Justice Department had set forth Cox's duties and responsibil-
ities. See 38 Fed. Reg. 14,688 (1973). He was subsequently dismissed by Acting
Attorney General Bork, pursuant to presidential instructions. Although this
dismissal was later held illegal in Nader v. Bork, 366 F. Supp. 104 (D.D.C. 1973),
Congress was concerned "how best to prevent future Executive interference
with the Watergate investigation." Id. at 109.
9. Hearings on Elliot L. Richardson, supra note 3, at 143-225 (1973).
10. See Special Prosecutor and Watergate Grand Jury Legislation: Hear-
ings on H.J. Res. 784 and H.R. 10,937 (and related bills) Before the Subcomm. on
Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1973); S. REP. No. 595, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); S. REP. No. 596, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1973) (both reports on Proposed Independent Special Prosecutor Act of
1973).
11. See Removing Politics from the Administration of Justice: Hearings on
S. 2803 and S. 2978 Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) [hereinafter cited as Hear-
ings on S. 2803].
12. See S. REP. No. 981, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) (Final Report of the Sen-
ate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities).
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of the Ford administration. In May 1976, a proposal called the
Watergate Reorganization and Reform Act of 1976 emerged in
the Senate.' 3 That bill would have created a Division of Gov-
ernment Crimes in the Justice Department and a mechanism
to appoint special prosecutors to investigate allegations that
specified high government officials had committed crimes.14
Deputy Attorney General Tyler, testifying on behalf of the Ford
administration, vigorously opposed both parts of the bill. He
pointed out that the Department had already established a
Public Integrity Section within its Criminal Division which, he
believed, rendered a new Government Crimes Division unnec-
essary and undesirable.'5 Tyler also argued that the creation of
a special prosecutor's office would infringe upon the executive
branch's constitutional responsibility to enforce the law.' 6
Despite this criticism, Congress continued to press for spe-
cial prosecutor legislation. In the spring of 1977, after President
Carter had assumed office, the Senate Committee on Govern-
mental Affairs published its report on the Public Officials Integ-
rity Act of 1977.17 The report recommended sweeping
legislation "to preserve and promote the integrity of public offi-
cials and institutions." 8 Like the 1976 bill, this 1977 proposal
would have established an Office of Government Crimes within
the Department of Justice.19 The bill disqualified from serving
as the director of the office anyone who had been active2 0 dur-
ing the preceding five years in "working for a candidate for any
elected federal office." 2 The Office would have had jurisdiction
over any "federal criminal violations by any elected or ap-
pointed federal employee related directly or indirectly to his
13. S. 495, as amended, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); S. REP. No. 823, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
14. See S. REP. No. 823, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) (tit. I). For related bills
and the original version of S. 495, see The Watergate Reorganization and Re-
form Act of 1975: Hearings on S. 495 Before the Senate Comm. on Government
Operations, Part 1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 159, 310, 315 (1975).
15. The Watergate Reorganization and Reform Act of 1976, Hearings on S.
495 Amended; Before the Senate Comm on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
(May 26, 1976) (Statement of Harold R. Tyler, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, at
1-4) (unpublished) (on file at the Minnesota Law Review) [hereinafter cited as
Hearings on S. 495 Amended].
16. Id. at 5-6.
17. S. REP. No. 170, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
18. Id. at 167.
19. Id. at 36, 80-81.
20. Section 592(a)(2) of the bill defined "active" as holding a "high-level
position of trust and responsibility" in a campaign organization or a political
party that was working to elect a candidate to any federal office. Id. at 80, 176.
21. Id. at 80.
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governmental position."22 The bill also required the appoint-
ment of a special prosecutor if the Department of Justice re-
ceived nonfrivolous allegations of wrongdoing against any
individual holding named high offices in government.23
The Senate committee based its preference for an in-
dependent special prosecutor on the premise that an Attorney
General cannot "act in a situation where he has a conflict of in-
terest or the appearance thereof," and a conflict of interest
arises if the Attorney General receives allegations that the
President-who appoints the Attorney General-or an associ-
ate of the President has committed a crime.24 Because of this
conflict of interest, the Senate committee was convinced that
the prosecutor "must have independence," and attempted to
achieve this necessary independence by providing that the At-
torney General could discharge a court-appointed, temporary
special prosecutor only "for extraordinary improprieties." 25
The 1976 and 1977 bills contained the basic outline of the
legislation that Congress ultimately enacted in 1978. Although
the Act Congress passed did not establish an office for govern-
ment crimes and made substantial changes in special prosecu-
tor provisions, the two earlier bills articulated the recusance
theory on which the Act was based: a neutral party, not a friend
or political associate, must make the decision whether to prose-
cute the accused.2 6 In 1978, two bills incorporating this theory
and creating a mechanism for appointing a special prosecutor
went forward, one through the House of Representatives, 2 7 and
one through the Senate.28 A conference committee resolved the
differences between the two bills and produced the Act as it
now exists.29
The special prosecutor provisions were enacted as Title 28
of the United States Code, sections 49 and 591-598.30 These pro-
visions are triggered if the Attorney General receives allega-
tions concerning a person in one of six classes. The first four
22. Id.
23. Id. at 51, 167-70. The special prosecutor provisions in the 1977 bill cov-
ered nearly the same classes of officials as the provisions that Congress finally
enacted. See 28 U.S.C. § 592 (Supp. II 1979).
24. S. REP. No. 170, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1977).
25. Id. at 7.
26. H.R. REP. 1307, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-5 (1978).
27. See H.R. 9705, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), analyzed in.H.RL REP. No.
1307, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-12 (1978).
28. See S. 555, as amended, 95th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. (1978), analyzed in S.
REP. No. 170, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 51-160 (1977).
29. See H. REP. No. 1756, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 65, 77-80 (1978).
30. 28 U.S.C. §§ 49, 591-598 (Supp. I1 1979).
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classes consist of the President and Vice-President, members
of the Cabinet, individuals in the Executive Office of the Presi-
dent whose salaries are above a specified level, most of the
high-ranking officers in the Department of Justice subordinate
to the Attorney General, the Director and Deputy Director of
Central Intelligence, and the Commissioner of Internal Reve-
nue.31 The fifth class includes those persons in the first four
classes who held those offices at any time during the incum-
bency of the President, or during the term of the immediately
preceding President, if the latter was of the same political party
as the incumbent President.32 The sixth class embraces all of-
ficers of the "principal national campaign committee seeking
the election or reelection of the President."33
Under sections 591 and 592 of the Act, if the Attorney Gen-
eral receives "specific information" that a person in one of the
above classes has violated a federal criminal law "other than a
violation constituting a petty offense," the Attorney General
must conduct a "preliminary investigation."3 4 If at the end of
the investigation, which cannot exceed ninety days, the Attor-
ney General 'Tmds that the matter is so unsubstantiated that
no further investigation or prosecution" is warranted, the Attor-
ney General must file a memorandum with a special three-
judge court.35 Not only does that end the matter, but the mem-
orandum may not be made public without leave of the court.3 6
If, however, the Attorney General finds that the matter
does warrant further investigation, he or she must apply to the
court for appointment of a special prosecutor.3 7 The Act limits
the court's discretion in selecting a special prosecutor only by
requiring that the selection be "appropriate" and by disqualify-
ing any person who "recently" was a federal government em-
ployee. 38 The special court defines the special prosecutor's
31. 28 U.S.C. § 591(b) (1)-(b) (4) (Supp. Il 1979). The Act also covers the
Special Representative for Trade Negotiations. See 5 U.S.C. § 5312 (Supp. IV
1980).
32. 28 U.S.C. § 591(b) (5) (Supp. Ell 1979).
33. Id. § 591(b)(6).
34. Id. §§ 591(a), 592(a).
35. Id §592(b)(1).
36. Id. §592(b)(3).
37. Id. § 592(c) (1).
38. Id. §§ 593(b), 593(d). An "appropriate" special prosecutor, according to
the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, is one who is "independent, both
in reality and in appearance, from the President and the Attorney General." S.
REP. No. 170, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 66 (1977). Thus, a United States attorney or
other Justice Department employee would be an inappropriate selection. Id.
1982]
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"prosecutorial jurisdiction,"39 but within that jurisdiction the
special prosecutor has "full power and independent authority"
to exercise all the powers of the Attorney General and the De-
partment of Justice.40 In exercising these powers, the statute
provides that special prosecutors shall, to the extent that they
deem appropriate, "comply with the written policies of the De-
partment of Justice respecting enforcement of the criminal
laws. '4 1 Finally, the Attorney General can remove a special
prosecutor "only for extraordinary impropriety, physical disa-
bility, mental incapacity, or any other condition that substan-
tially impairs the performance of such special prosecutor's
duties."42
At the close of the Carter administration, there had been
eight filings under the Act.43 The Attorney General had re-
quested the appointment of a special prosecutor in only two of
these cases.4 In one of the remaining six filings, the Attorney
General concluded that the "specific information" that Presi-
dent Carter, Vice President Mondale, John White, Chairman of
the Democratic National Committee, and other high level offi-
cials had solicited political contributions on federal property
was "so unsubstantiated that no further investigation" was
warranted.45
39. 28 U.S.C. § 593(b) (Supp. 1I 1979).
40. Id. § 594(a). The special prosecutor, however, does not have the power
to authorize wiretapping and related interceptions. Id. The Attorney General
has sole authority over these activities under 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (Supp. 11 1979).
41. 28 U.S.C. § 594(f) (Supp. I 1979). The 1977 bill, which was the prede-
cessor of the Act, required the special prosecutor to adhere much more closely
to the Justice Department's policies. The 1977 bill would have required compli-
ance "to the maximum extent practicable" with the "written policies of the De-
partment of Justice." S. REP. No. 170, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 69, 172 (1977).
42. 28 U.S.C. § 596(a) (1) (Supp. Il 1979).
43. Letter from Michael W. Dolan, Acting Assistant Attorney General, to
Senator William S. Cohen (May 21, 1981), reprinted in Special Prosecutor Provi-
sions of Ethics in Government Act of 1978: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Oversight of Government Management of the Senate Comm. on Governmental
Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 235, 244 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
44. Id. The Report of Special Prosecutor Christy on Alleged Possession of
Cocaine by Hamilton Jordan in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 844(a), May 28, 1980,
has been made public, and appears id., at 378-433. The report of special prose-
cutor Gallinghouse in the Kraft case has never been made public.
45. Report of the Attorney General Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 592(b), No. 79-2
at 13, filed in the Special Prosecutor Division, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia, February 1, 1979 (made public with leave of court under
§ 592(d) (2) on February 2, 1979), reprinted in Hearings, supra note 43, at 253,
265. See Press Release of Attorney General Bell, Dep't of Justice, Feb. 2, 1979.
Attorney General Civiletti also refused to request a special prosecutor in
another filing. See Letters from Attorney General Civiletti to Senators Ken-
nedy, Proxmire, and Laxalt and Representative Conyers (March 11, 1980). Civi-
letti wrote these letters pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 595(e) (Supp. UI 1979), giving
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In view of the publicity attending appointments of special
prosecutors, it is highly probable that the request of William
French Smith, the present Attorney General, for appointment
of a special prosecutor to investigate allegations concerning
Raymond J. Donovan, Secretary of Labor, is the only such re-
quest made thus far by the Reagan administration.4 6 In addi-
tion, Attorney General Smith has filed a memorandum with the
special court concluding that appointment of a special prosecu-
tor was not warranted in the Richard Allen case.47
III. PROBLEMS UNDER THE ACT
A. WORKABILrY AND FAmNEss
Experience has demonstrated that the Act may be both un-
workable and unfair.A8 For example, it is sometimes difficult to
determine whether the information that an Attorney General
receives implicating a person covered by the Act is "specific"
within the meaning of section 592(a).49 Suppose a citizens'
group files a complaint in a federal court against a political
party's national committee, alleging in conclusory terms that a
group of politicians, including at least one person covered by
the Act, violated a federal election law. 50 The suit thereafter
comes to the Attorney General's attention. The Act certainly
provides little guidance to the Attorney General in determining
whether the allegations in the complaint are "specific." The
Act does not give any guidance whether the answer to this
question depends upon the facts pleaded in the complaint.
Moreover, if the complaint is not "specific," the Act does not
say whether the Attorney General must wait until discovery
reasons why he had concluded that he was "without statutory authority" to re-
quest appointment of a special prosecutor to investigate allegations made
against G. William Miller, who was at that time Secretary of the Treasury.
These letters were made public at the request of the Attorney General pursu-
ant to § 595(e).
46. See Wash. Post, Jan. 14, 1982, § 1, at 10, col. 3.
47. N.Y. Times, Dec. 24, 1981, § 1, at 14, col. 1.
48. See generally STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNmENT MAN-
AGEMENT OF THE SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNmENTAL AFAIRS, 97TH CONG., IST
SEss., REPORT ON SPECIAL PROSECUTOR PROVISIONS OF ETHICS IN GOVERNMENT
ACT OF 1978 (Comm. Print 1981) [hereinafter cited as REPORT].
49. 28 U.S.C. § 592(a) (Supp. 1I 1979). See S. REP. No. 170, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 54 (1977) ("The Committee does not expect a special prosecutor to be ap-
pointed whenever a single note or telephone call is received suggesting that a
high-ranking official is a 'crook."').
50. See, e.g., Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86
Stat. 3 (1972), as amended by Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of
1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263.
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proceeds in the case or must instead communicate directly
with plaintiff's counsel to see if counsel has any "specific
information."
Even if the Attorney General determines that the allega-
tions of misconduct are "specific," it is difficult for the Attorney
General to determine the extent of the subsequent ninety-day
preliminary investigations.51 It is clear that the Attorney Gen-
eral may not use a grand jury to conduct a preliminary investi-
gation, nor may he or she dispose of the matter by filing an
information and entering into a plea bargain.52 It is not clear,
however, whether the Attoriney General may order a full field
investigation by the FBI. Nor is it apparent whether investiga-
tors may interview potential witnesses several times. 53
In addition to these workability problems, the Act may
force the Attorney General to request the appointment of a
special prosecutor even though such an appointment would not
be fair. The Attorney General, for example, apparently must
apply for a special prosecutor even though he or she believes
there is a strong probability that prosecution will never be war-
ranted.5 4 The Attorney General must apply for a special prose-
cutor even though the alleged offense, if proved, would not
result in a conviction. The Attorney General must even apply
for a special prosecutor although the Department of Justice
would normally not prosecute the offense under the Depart-
ment's written rules and standards.55 Thus, situations may
51. See 28 U.S.C. § 592(a) (Supp. 1Tr 1979).
52. S. REP. No. 170, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 54-55 (1977).
53. See Wash. Post, Nov. 25, 1981, § 1, at 3, col. 1 (Eighteen U.S. Senators
call Department of Justice's extensive investigation of Richard Allen illegal).
54. Under 28 U.S.C. §§ 592(b), 592(c) (Supp. I1 1979), the Attorney General
must come to the certain conclusion within 90 days that "the matter is so un-
substantiated that no further investigation or prosecution is warranted" or else
request appointment of a special prosecutor. Thus, if the Attorney General is
fairly certain that the matter will not result in prosecution of the official, but
believes further investigation is necessary to make sure, the Act leaves no
room for the Attorney General to pursue this avenue. A special prosecutor
must perform the task. This was Attorney General Civiletti's predicament in
the Jordan case. Report of the Attorney General Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 592(c) (1), No. 79-7, at 3, fied in the Special Prosecutor Division, U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia, November 19, 1979 (made public with
leave of court under § 592(d) (2) on November 29, 1979), reprinted in Hearings,
supra note 43, at 359, 361.
55. It is entirely conceivable that the Attorney General may find that a
matter warrants further investigation under § 592(b), requiring appointment of
a special prosecutor, but that there is no chance of ultimately getting a convic-
tion. Evidence crucial for conviction may be missing, for example. In the Jor-
dan and Kraft cases, there was no seizure of cocaine-the subject of the
allegations against them-but special prosecutors were nonetheless appointed.
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trigger the Act's special prosecutor provisions despite the ab-
sence of enough evidence to prosecute or to convict the person
involved. The Act thus unfairly exposes people whose cases
would ordinarily be summarily dismissed to the intrusive in-
vestigations of a specially appointed federal official.
The enormous publicity that accompanies the appointment
of a special prosecutor exacerbates this unfair result. Aside
from the resulting personal anxiety, this publicity can be
financially burdensome. Once a decision to request appoint-
ment of a special prosecutor has become public knowledge, ac-
cused persons may feel compelled to employ attorneys to
institute an investigation on their behalf and thus commit
themselves to spending large sums of money.56
Congress carefully drafted the Act to ensure that there
would be no publicity surrounding the application for a special
prosecutor without leave of the court.5 7 Moreover, only the At-
torney General or the court may reveal the identity or jurisdic-
tion of a special prosecutor once one has been appointed.58
Despite these strictures, however, applications for appointment
of special prosecutors have become public without court ap-
proval.59 While it is true that in many situations, publicity may
be inevitable regardless of any precaution, there is little doubt
See Hearings, supra note 43, at 117 (Statement of Rudolph Giuliani). This re-
sult completely contradicts a basic principle of federal prosecution. "[B] oth as
a matter of fundamental fairness and in the interest of the efficient administra-
tion of justice, no prosecution should be initiated against any person unless the
government believes that the person probably will be found guilty by an unbi-
ased trier of fact." U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL PROS-
EcUToN 6 (July 1980). See also Hearings, supra note 43, at 12-13 (Testimony of
Benjamin Civiletti) (Justice Department normally does not prosecute individ-
ual possession of small amounts of cocaine).
The recent publication date of Principles of Federal Prosecution may ex-
plain why the Act does not require the special prosecutor to adhere very
closely to the Department of Justice's policies. See supra note 41 and accompa-
nying text. At the time Congress considered the Act, there was no concise
statement of federal prosecution policies with which a special prosecutor could
comply. S. REP. No. 170, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 70 (1977).
56. Mr. Jordan's legal fees reportedly exceeded six figures, more than
twice his annual salary. Hearings, supra note 43, at 36 (testimony of Lloyd Cut-
ler). See also id. at 95, 117 (Statement of Rudolph Giuliani). As former Attor-
ney General Civiletti has observed, "[a]nyone who has been subjected to a
federal criminal investigation knows that it is no laughing matter. It can exact
a great cost from the target himself and from the Government as well." Civi-
letti, Post-Watergate Legislation in Retrospect, 34 Sw. L. J. 1043, 1055 (1981):
57. 28 U.S.C. § 592(d) (2) (Supp. 1I 1979).
58. Id. § 593(b).
59. Appointment of a special prosecutor in the Kraft case was, for exam-
ple, leaked to the public without court approval. See N.Y. Times, Mar. 25, 1981
§ 1, at 1, col. 5; Hearings, supra note 43, at 19 (Testimony of Benjamin Civiletti).
1982]
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that at least some investigations of government officials would
not become public prior to convening a grand jury if there were
no specialized appointment procedure. Public revelation seems
especially harsh if the reference to the special prosecutor is
based on alleged facts that would not ordinarily be put before a
federal grand jury if the accused were an ordinary citizen. The
reference of the Jordan case to a special prosecutor and the de-
cision not to refer the Allen case, for example, resulted in pub-
lic controversy beyond the attention which the allegations
warranted. The special prosecutor provisions subjected these
people to public scrutiny that was premature compared to the
privacy that would have been accorded to private citizens or
other government officials not covered by the Act.
One last problem of the Act is its inapplicability to cases in
which its rationale supports the appointment of a special prose-
cutor. The Act does not cover many lower-level executive ap-
pointees. Moreover, the six classes of people to which the Act
applies do not include close family members of a high-ranking
official in the executive branch. It is clearly possible for the At-
torney General to face a disabling conflict of interest if he or
she receives allegations that executive officials' close relatives
have violated a federal criminal law. In one case in which such
a potential conflict of interest might have been a problem, At-
torney General Bell appointed a nonstatutory "special counsel"
to handle the "Carter warehouse" investigation. 60 In another
60. Paul J. Curran was appointed on March 20, 1979, by Attorney General
Bell, as a special counsel to investigate the financial transactions of the Carter
family peanut warehouse. Press Release of the Department of Justice, March
20, 1979; see 44 Fed. Reg. 25,837 (1979) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. Part 0); Hear-
ings, supra note 43, at 126 (Statement of Rudolph Giuliani). Curran, a Republi-
can and former U.S. Attorney in the Southern District of New York,
investigated allegations that money from $7 million in loans from the National
Bank of Georgia to the Carter peanut business was diverted to President
Carter's 1976 election campaign. Press Release, supra at 1; N.Y. Times, Mar. 17,
1979, § 1, at 8, col. 3.
Although President Carter was covered by the Act, neither Billy Carter nor
Lillian Carter, the other partners in the family business, would fall under the
Act. Press Release, supra at 4; see 28 U.S.C. § 591(b) (Supp. I1 1979). The Jus-
tice Department determined that § 604(2) of the Act prohibited appointment of
a statutory special prosecutor because "basic information involving the loan
transactions was developed by the Department of Justice prior to ... the effec-
tive date of the Act." Press Release, supra at 3. See Ethics in Government Act
of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, tit. VI, § 604, 92 Stat. 1875.
Curran's appointment as a "special counsel" rather than as a "special pros-
ecutor" created some controversy. N.Y. Times, Mar. 21, 1979, § 1, at 1, col. 4; id.
Mar. 22, 1979, § 1, at 1, col. 3. See also id. Mar. 23, 1979, § 1, at 16, col. 1. It was
argued that Attorney General Bell could have voluntarily appointed a special
prosecutor with greater independence. Id. Mar. 22, 1979, § 1, at 16, col. 5. The
controversy is an example of executive branch hesitancy to surrender control
[Vol. 66:963
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case, the Justice Department addressed the Billy Carter-Libya
matter through regular channels, drawing criticism that Attor-
ney General Civiletti had a conflict of interest.6 '
B. CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS
The constitutionality of the Act has been the subject of ex-
tensive debate. Although the vast majority of commentators
have argued that the Act is constitutional,62 both Deputy Attor-
ney General Tyler, speaking for the Ford administration, 63 and
Attorney General Smith, speaking for the Reagan adminis-
tration, 64  have expressed strong doubts about its
over investigations of executive officers. The March 20, 1979, Justice Depart-
ment statement outlining Curran's powers stated that the Special Counsel's
' prosecutive decisions ... must finally be approved by the Assistant Attorney
General for the Criminal Division." Press Release, supra at 5. Yet the formal
order issued in the Federal Register on May 3, 1979, apparently gave Curran
greater independence. 44 Fed. Reg. 25,837-38 (1979) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R.
Part 0).
61. A Senate Judiciary special subcommittee conducted an inquiry into
the Libyan government's relationship with Billy Carter, the President's
brother, and into the Justice Department's investigation of Carter's receipt of
loans from Libya and his failure to register as a foreign agent. The subcommit-
tee concluded "there was no evidence that either the investigation or disposi-
tion of the case by the Criminal Division was skewed in favor of Billy Carter
because he is the brother of the President." S. REP. No. 1015, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess. 62 (1980). Attorney General Civiletti, however, was criticized in the Sen-
ate report for predicting to the President that criminal proceedings would not
be instituted against Billy Carter. Id. at 68, 70-72, 82.
The Office of Professional Responsibility in the Justice Department also is-
sued a report on the investigation of the Billy Carter-Libya matter. While con-
cluding there had been no impropriety, conflict of interest, or appearance of
conflict of interest on the part of Mr. Civiletti or the Criminal Division, the re-
port criticized the Attorney General for incorrectly answering a press confer-
ence question concerning whether he had ever talked to the President about
the Billy Carter case. Acting Attorney General Renfrew, Status Report of the
Office of Professional Responsibility on the Investigation Conducted Concern-
ing Various Matters Pertaining to Billy Carter, Aug. 1, 1980 (unpublished) (on
Me at the Minnesota Law Review); DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT OF
THE OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSMIIrY ON THE INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED
CONCERNING VARIOUS MATrERS PERTAINING TO BILLY CARTER 4, 8-10 (1q81) (un-
published) (on file at the Minnesota Law Review).
62. Burkhoff, Appointment and Removal under the Federal Constitution:
The Impact of Buckley v. Valeo, 22 WAYNE L. REV. 1335, 1373 (1976). See gener-
ally Hearings on Special Prosecutor Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
93d Cong., 1st Sess., pts. 1 & 2 (1973).
63. Hearings on S. 495 Amended, supra note 15, at 2-5 (Statement of Harold
R. Tyler, Jr., Deputy Attorney General).
64. Attorney General Smith has expressed "serious reservations concern-
ing the constitutionality" of the Act, and has urged its repeaL Letter from Wil-
liam French Smith, Attorney General, to Michael Davidson, Senate Legal
Counsel (April 17, 1981); Hearings, supra note 43, at 130-31 (statement of Ru-
dolph Giuliani, Associate Attorney General). See also N.Y. Times, Apr. 21, 1981,




The concerns of Tyler and Smith result because the Act di-
vests the executive branch of part of its prosecutorial authority.
In providing for an independent special prosecutor who would
have sole responsibility to investigate and to prosecute miscon-
duct within the executive branch, Congress sought to remedy
the threatened evil of unaccountable presidential power inher-
ent in White House self-investigation and self-prosecution.6 5
Congress, however, arguably went too far in guaranteeing the
independence of the special prosecutor, and thus violated the
constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. Specifically, by
prohibiting the Attorney General from selecting the special
prosecutor and vesting this power in a special court, the Act ar-
guably violates the appointment and removal clause of article
H, section 2, clause 2.66 This clause states that the President
shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate,
shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges
of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States,
whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which
shall be established by Law; but the Congress may by Law vest the Ap-
pointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the Presi-
dent alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.67
The Constitution clearly does not permit or authorize Con-
gress itself to appoint either "officers" or "inferior officers" of
the United States. In Springer v. Philippine Islands,68 the
Supreme Court held that the Philippine legislature would vio-
late the separation of powers principle implicit in the Philip-
65. Nader v. Bork, 366 F. Supp. 104, 109 (D.D.C. 1973); H. R. REP. No. 1307,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1978); S. REP. No. 170, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1977).
See also W. MONDALE, THE AccouNTABmnry OF POWER 190-92 (1975).
66. The separation of powers problem raised by the Act also touches un-
derlying concerns about the limits of congressional power in creating an office
under the "necessary and proper" clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cL 18. See E.
CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT'S REMOVAL POWER UNDER THE CONSTITUTION 56-58
(1927). It also touches concerns about the President's duty to "take Care that
the Laws are faithfully executed" under article U, § 3, and the proper degree of
judicial involvement in the investigation and prosecution process under article
III. See infra notes 90-95 and accompanying text.
67. U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 2, cL 2. On the appointment power generally, see 2
B. SCHWARTZ, A CoMMENTARY ON THE CONSTTUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 40-
46 (1963); W. H. TAFT, OUR CHIEF MAGISTRATE AND HIS POWERS 55-77 (1916);
Burkhoff supra note 62, at 1336-79; Note, Congressional Power under the Ap-
pointments Clause After Buckley v. Valeo, 75 MICH. L, REV. 627 (1977). On the
Framers' conception of the appointment power in relation to the separation of
powers doctrine, see THE FEDERALIST No. 76 (A. Hamilton), No. 48 (J.
Madison). Chief Justice Taft viewed the appointment power as a matter of in-
herent executive authority. See infra text accompanying notes 108-11.
68. 277 U.S. 189 (1928).
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pine Organic Act,69 which paralleled the United States
Constitution, by appointing the directors of a government bank
or coal company. The Court reasoned that the directors of
these government businesses were charged with executive du-
ties, and that legislative power does not include the power to
appoint public agents who exercise executive functions.70 Re-
cently, in Buckley v. Valeo,7' the Supreme Court relied on
Springer to strike down a law allowing congressional officers to
appoint members of the Federal Election Commission. The
Court noted that Congress gave election commissioners execu-
tive duties.72 Therefore, the Court held, the commissioners
were officers of the United States whom Congress could not ap-
point under article II, section 2, clause 2.73
Aside from disallowing direct congressional appointment of
executive officers, the Supreme Court has had little occasion to
decide who may exercise the appointment power. Article II,
section 2, clause 2 clearly dictates that the President, with Sen-
ate consent, appoint "Officers of the United States." Two issues
remain, however. First, is there a substantive difference be-
tween "officers," "inferior officers," and mere employees? Sec-
ond, what standard should the Court use in deciding whether
the President alone, the courts, or a department head should
appoint an inferior officer?
Traditionally, the Supreme Court has been reluctant to in-
voke a substantive standard to discern whether an appointee is
an "officer" under article II. Instead, the Court generally has
looked to the mode of appointment Congress selected to deter-
69. Organic Act of the Philippine Islands, Aug. 29, 1916, ch. 416, 39 Stat. 545.
70. 277 U.S. at 202-03.
71. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
72. Id. at 143.
73. Id. at 140-43. The Buckley Court, like the Court in United States v. Ger-
maine, 99 U.S. 508 (1878), acknowledged that "all persons who can be said to
hold an office under the government" are either "officers," or 'inferior officers"
under article II, § 2, clause 2. Id. at 510; 424 U.S. at 126. Unlike prior Courts,
however, the Buckley Court ascribed a substantive meaning to the term "of-
ficers" and apparently to the term "inferior officers." "[A]ny appointee exercis-
ing significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States is an 'Officer
of the United States,' and must, therefore, be appointed in the manner pre-
scribed" in article IL 424 U.S. at 126. Thus, the Court first considered the "sub-
stantial powers" federal election commissioners exercised, id. at 138, and then
determined that they were unconstitutionally appointed. Id. at 143. The Court
concluded that the commissioners, by the nature of the duty they were to per-
form, had to be appointed pursuant to article II, and so could not be appointed
by members of Congress. Although commentators have criticized the Buckley
Court's analysis, see, e.g., Burkhoff, .supra note 62, at 1362-69, Buckley does pro-
vide further guidance on the permissible location of the appointment power
and the nature of an "officer's" duties.
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mine the type of office the appointee held.74 The Court's ration-
ale suggests that the definition of a governmental position is
purely a congressional decision.75
The Supreme Court has also been reluctant to establish a
strict constitutional standard to govern Congress's power to
choose when "the President alone, . . . the Courts of Law, or
the Heads of Departments" may appoint an inferior officer
under the appointment and removal clause. Dicta in several
opinions indicate that the appointment power should be exer-
cised by the authority that is most appropriate in light of the
nature of the appointee's office. In Ex Parte Hennen,76 decided
in 1839, the Supreme Court examined the article H provision
for appointment of inferior officers in deciding whether a
United States district judge had the power to remove his
clerk.77  This appointment power, the Court noted, "Was no
doubt intended to be exercised by the department of the gov-
ernment to which the officer to be appointed most appropri-
ately belonged."78 The Court concluded, therefore, that
"Courts of Law" could appoint clerks of federal courts consist-
ently with article II, section 2, clause 2.79 The Court modified
Hennen's dicta in Ex Parte Siebold,80 decided in 1879, adopting
a less stringent approach. The Siebold Court examined
whether a circuit court could appoint federal election supervi-
74. See, e.g., United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508 (1878). In Germaine,
the Court reasoned that a surgeon appointed by the Commissioner of Pensions
could not be an "officer" because the President did not appoint him with Sen-
ate consent. The Court further argued that the Commissioner of Pensions is
not the "head of a department," and so the surgeon could not have been ap-
pointed as an "inferior officer." Id. at 510-11. The Court did, however, supple-
ment this rationale, by considering the nature of the surgeon's employment. In
the Court's view, an officer's duties are continuing and permanent, whereas the
surgeon's duties were occasional and intermittent. Id. at 510-12. Despite this
additional argument, it is clear that the Germaine Court's governing rationale
was the congressionally accepted mode of appointment, not the nature of em-
ployment.
See also United States v. Hartwell, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 385 (1867). In deciding
whether Hartwell was an "officer," the Court looked at both the mode of the
clerk's appointment (he was appointed by a department head), and the "ten-
ure, duration, emolument, and duties" of the office. Id. at 393.
75. Although the Court set out a substantive standard to determine
whether appointees come under the appointment and removal clause in Buck-
ley v. Valeo, see supra note 73, it did not attempt to distinguish between "of-
ficers" and '"nferior officers."
76. 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 230 (1839).
77. For a discussion of whether a power of removal might be unconstitu-
tional, see infra notes 100-22 and accompanying text.
78. 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) at 257-58.
79. Id. at 261-62.
80. 100 U.S. 371 (1879).
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sors. Although the Court noted that Congress would be wise to
follow Hennen's "most appropriate department" dicta, the
Court refused to strike down an appointment mechanism un-
less there was an "incongruity of duty" in the arrangement.8 '
The Court concluded that circuit court appointment of election
supervisors would be as congruous, proper, or convenient as
appointment by the President or the head of a department.82
The Court's rationale in Buckley v. Valeo supports the
dicta in Hennen and Siebold. Although the narrow holding of
Buckley merely prohibits Congress from appointing officers of
the United States, 83 the Court based this holding on the need to
protect the constitutional separation of powers doctrine inher-
ent in the appointment and removal clause.8 4 The Court ar-
gued that both this doctrine and the clause would be violated if
Congress appointed officers who would be able to exercise ex-
ecutive powers.85 One can argue that the same separation of
powers concern should apply in deciding who should appoint
an inferior officer of the United States. It may be inappropriate,
for example, to allow a court to appoint an officer whose duties
are exclusively executive; the court's exercise of appointment
power, just like Congress's exercise of appointment power in
Buckley, may upset the traditional balance between the sepa-
rate branches of government. Because of the Buckley Court's
rationale and the dicta in Hennen and Siebold, many commen-
tators agree that the separation of powers doctrine prohibits
Congress from locating the appointment power in a department
in which such a power would be incongruous. 86
The special prosecutor provisions do not present a problem
concerning the "officer" and 'inferior officer" distinction within
the appointment and removal clause. Special prosecutors are
clearly "inferior officers" under article II. A "Court of Law" ap-
points them,87 thus making them 'inferior officers" under the
81. Id. at 397-98.
82. Both this "congruity in the duty" standard and Hennen's "Most appro-
priate department" standard appear to be very deferential to congressional de-
cisions. One commentator has argued that the Supreme Court should not even
review the congressional decision to vest the appointment of an inferior officer
in a particular department because this decision is a political question. E.
CoRwiN, supra note 66, at 66. Some language in Siebold supports this argu-
ment. See 100 U.S. at 398.
83. 424 U.S. at 135.
84. Id. at 120-24.
85. Id. at 132.
86. See, e.g., B. ScuwAlRz, supra note 67, at 46; Burkhoff supra note 62, at
1369-79.
87. But see Hearings on S. 495 Amended, supra note 15, at 10 (statement of
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Supreme Court's deferential standard.88
The method Congress selected to appoint these "inferior
officers" may, however, violate the appointment and removal
clause by placing the appointment power in an "incongruous"
department.89 Article II, section 3 of the. Constitution gives the
President the responsibility to "take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed."90 One of the duties that arises from this
charge is the duty to prosecute violations of the laws. In Buck-
ley, the Court noted that the authority to initiate civil litigation
was not "merely in aid of the legislative function of Congress,"
but was inherent in the President's responsibility under article
II, section 3.91 The Fifth Circuit has also expressly held that
prosecutorial power belongs solely to the executive branch
with which neither Congress nor the courts can interfere.92
Thus, one can argue that giving a court the power to appoint an
official who will exercise a prosecutorial function is incongru-
ous with the constitutional requirement that the executive
branch have sole control over this power.
It is not clear, however, that it is incongruous in all cases
Harold R. Tyler, Jr., Deputy Attorney General); Memorandum in Support of
Plaintiff's Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, at 12-13, Kraft v. Gallinghouse,
No. 80-2952 (D.D.C. 1980), reprinted in Hearings, supra note 43, at 294. 307-08
(this appointment arrangement is defective under article I, § 2, clause 2 be-
cause a three judge panel convened solely for the purpose of appointing a spe-
cial prosecutor is not a "court of law").
88. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
89. One could also ar.gue that the dual appointment process, in which the
Attorney General petitions for a special prosecutor whom the court then ap-
points, violates this clause. Article 11, section 2, clause 2 does not explicitly pro-
vide for two departments to appoint an inferior officer in conjunction with each
other. Yet, the Attorney General's role is not literally one of "appointment"
He or she merely initiates the appointment process. As the President's chief
law enforcement officer, the Attorney General is an appropriate person to per-
form this task. Further, even if one concedes that the Attorney General "ap-
points" the special prosecutor, the notion of dual branch participation in the
appointment process is not foreign to article 11; the Senate confirms presiden-
tial nomination of officers.
90. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
91. 424 U.S. at 137-38.
92. United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied,
381 U.S. 935 (1965). But see United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), in which
the Court held that, notwithstanding the Executive branch's exclusive author-
ity and absolute discretion to decide whether to prosecute a case, the President
does not have absolute control over what evidence may be used in a given
criminal case. Id. at 693-97. If a valid regulation gives a special prosecutor ex-
plicit power to contest the invocation of executive privilege in the process of
seeking evidence relevant to the special prosecutor's duties, the President can-
not intervene, asserting that the special prosecutor's demand for evidence is a
nonjusticiable political question. Id.
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for courts to appoint executive officers.93 By allowing a circuit
court to appoint federal election supervisors, the Court in Ex
Parte Siebold suggested that the presidential duty to "take
Care that the Laws be faithfully executed" can be consistent
with court appointment of officers who will perform executive
tasks.94 It appears to be particularly appropriate for courts to
appoint these officers if the executive branch is unable effec-
tively to carry out its prosecutorial duty in doing so. In cases
that demand a special prosecutor, the Attorney General argua-
bly cannot effectively choose special prosecutors because of the
conflict of interest which allegations of executive misconduct
engender.9S To remedy this disability, Congress placed the ap-
pointment power in the department that seemed to be most ca-
pable of making an independent and well-reasoned decision-
the courts.9 6
One provision of the present Act, however, seems to render
the Act unconstitutional, despite the argument for allowing
courts to appoint special prosecutors: special prosecutors need
not adhere to Department of Justice policy on criminal prose-
cutions.9 7 This provision confronts the Buckley Court's con-
cern that the vesting of executive power outside of the
executive branch would violate the separation of powers doc-
trine. The Act creates an executive office whose incumbent is
neither appointed by the President nor the Attorney General.
The appointee is also not obliged to follow established execu-
tive policy. This glaring absence of special prosecutor account-
ability seriously undermines the basic separation of powers
93. There is legal precedent, for example, for court review of prosecutorial
discretion and abuse of authority despite the warning of United States v. Cox,
342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 935 (1965), that
neither Congress nor the courts may interfere with the prosecution function.
See, e.g., Garris v. United States, 390 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Spencer v. Crimi-
nal Court, 214 Ind. 551, 15 N.E.2d 1020 (1938); Note, The Special Prosecutor in the
Federal Systemn A Proposal, 11 AM. Cnim. L. REV. 577, 583-94 (1973). Further,
federal courts have the power to fill vancancies in the office of United States
Attorney, although the court's authority in such cases is only temporary. 28
U.S.C. § 546 (1976). The President may remove the court appointee at any time,
and, with Senate consent, fill the vancancy.
94. 100 U.S. 371, 397-98 (1879).
95. See supra text accompanying notes 24-25.
96. One commentator has defended judicial appointment of a special pros-
ecutor in certain cases. Tuerkheimer, The Executive Investigates Itself, 65 CAL.
L. REV. 597, 632 (1977). At least one court has argued that it must guarantee the
administration of justice and appointed a special prosecutor when the district
attorney refused to prosecute an indictment that the court refused to dismiss.
United States v. Jacobsen, Crim. No. CR-6-74-3 (N.D. Tex., Oct. 23, 1974). See
generally Comment, 9 Sun oLK U.L REv. 1434 (1975).
97. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
1982]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
doctrine; the President must be able to exercise some control
over those performing executive functions.9 8 This arrangement
clearly runs contrary to the trend, signalled in Buckley,9 9 of in-
creased presidential authority to control prosecution. If one
couples the absence of executive control over the appointment
of the special prosecutor with this lack of accountability, the
special prosecutor provisions arguably violate article II, section
II, clause 2 of the Constitution.
Unlike Congress's method of appointing special prosecu-
tors, Congress's restrictions on the President's power to re-
move special prosecutors do not raise serious constitutional
problems. 00 The Act provides that the Attorney General can
only remove a special prosecutor "for extraordinary impropri-
ety, physical disability, mental incapacity, or any other condi-
tion that substantially impairs" the prosecutor's
performance.' 0 ' The Attorney General's action is also subject to
judicial review.l02
Although article I, section 2, clause 2, expressly provides
for the appointment of officers, it is silent on the power of re-
moval. 0 3 In the face of this silence, Congress, the Court, and
98. This is a necessary corollary of the President's responsibility to "take
Care that the Laws be faithfully executed" under article II, section 3. As Ham-
ilton asserted, unified energy in the executive branch is essential to steady and
competent administration of the laws, and also forces the President to be ac-
countable to political opinion. THE FEDERAUST No. 70 (A. Hamilton).
99. See supra text accompanying note 91.
100. One of the more interesting aspects of the Special Prosecutor Act is its
separation of the power to appoint from the power to remove. The Court has
never directly faced the question of whether these powers are inseparable. The
Court in Hennen did note, however, that "[i]n the absence of all constitutional
provision, or statutory regulation, it would seem to be a sound and necessary
rule, to consider the power of removal as incident to the power of appoint-
ment." 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) at 259. Although this language suggests that Congress
can give the two powers to two different departments, there may be a separa-
tion of powers problem in doing so.
Executive removal of a court-appointed special prosecutor may not pose
such severe separation of powers dangers. Given the Buckley Court's broad
concern for executive control of the prosecution function, vesting both the ap-
pointment and removal power in a court would offend the integrity of the exec-
utive branch. This would cause the President to lose all control over the
special prosecutor. Thus, Congress has used a new theory of removal: vesting
the power to remove is a matter of congressional decision under the "necessary
and proper" clause, governed by the overall separation of powers principles of
independence and accountability. Congress may split the appointment and re-
moval authority between the judicial and executive branches if such a split
does not threaten the integrity of either.
101. 28 U.S.C. § 596(a) (Supp. DI f979).
102. Id. at § 596(a)(3).
103. For discussion of the removal power, see generally E. CoRWiN, supra
note 66; B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 67, at 47-56; Cross, The Removal Power of the
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the executive branch have struggled for years over the scope of
the removal power under the Constitution. After some initial
debate,104 it became clear that Congress, and in particular the
Senate, cannot remove officers. The Constitution limits direct
Senate participation to the confirmation process, in which it
may reject presidential selections. 05
Yet all officers appointed obviously may not serve for life.
In Hennen, the Supreme Court first articulated a theory of re-
moval which is still generally accepted. Affirming a federal
judge's power to remove a court-appointed inferior officer, the
Court reasoned that "[fun the absence of all constitutional pro-
vision, or statutory regulation, it would seem to be a sound and
necessary rule, to consider the power of removal as incident to
the power of appointment."106
This doctrine does not, however, answer whether Congress
may limit the removal power of another branch. 07 In Myers v.
United States, 08 the Court considered whether Congress could
require Senate consent for presidential removal of first class
postmasters. 09 The Court concluded that the President had
exclusive power to remove executive officers appointed with
Senate confirmation." 0 Congress, it determined, had the au-
President and the Test of Responsibility, 40 Co- NLL L. Q. 81 (1954); Parker, The
Removal Power of the President and Independent Administrative Agencies, 36
IND. L. J. 63 (1960); Comment, Abolition of Federal Offices as an Infringement
on the President's Power to Remove Federal Executive Officers: A Reassessment
of Constitutional Doctrines, 42 FoRDHAms L. REV. 562 (1974).
104. In the early years of the constitution, it was argued that the President
needed Senate consent to remove the officers that the Senate had confirmed.
See Burkhoff, supra note 62, at 1379-88; see also Myers v. United States, 272 U.S.
52, 109-48 (1926).
105. See Comment, supra note 102, at 567.
106. Ex Parte Hennen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) at 259.
107. This debate began as early as 1867, when Congress passed the Tenure
of Office Act, ch. 154, 14 Stat. 430 (1867), which provided that the Secretaries of
State and War could be removed only with Senate consent. President John-
son's refusal to comply with this statute in dismissing Secretary of War Stan-
ton was the basis of his impeachment in 1868. See Burkhoff, supra note 62, at
1388-93.
108. 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
109. Act of July 12, 1876, ch. 179, § 6, 19 Stat. 80-81.
110. 272 U.S. at 176. Chief Justice Taft argued that the President's duty
under article II to execute the laws suggested an inherent executive power to
control removal of officers. This theory of "inherent executive power" did not
go unquestioned. Professor Corwin delivered an exhaustive critique of Taft's
theory, arguing that Congress has power to affect removal of officers through
the "necessary and proper" clause of article I, § 8, clause 18. Corwin asserted
that although presidential power to remove cabinet officers is central to control
over the executive branch, this is true because of the "inherent" political and
advisory nature of the cabinet positions-not through inherent executive con-
trol over any officers appointed by the President or a department head. E.
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thority only to vest the appointment of inferior officers."' The
Court limited this broad doctrine in Humphrey's Executor v.
United States,112 holding that Congress could limit the Presi-
dent's power to remove a Federal Trade Commissioner.113 The
Court noted that Myers's broad presidential removal theory ap-
plied only to purely executive officers and did not apply to
quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial officers, despite the Presi-
dent's power to appoint them.114 With a quasi-judicial adminis-
trative body such as the FTC, unchecked presidential removal
power would threaten the most essential quality of the Com-
mission-independence from presidential or political pressure.
The Court continued to narrow Myers in Wiener v. United
States."15 In Wiener, the Court held that the President could
not remove a member of the War Claims Commission without
cause, even though Congress had enacted no provisions gov-
erning or limiting the President's removal power.116 Like the
Court in Humphrey's Executor, the Wiener Court examined the
function of the Commission and concluded that since it was an
adjudicatory body, Congress intended to preserve the Commis-
sion's independence, and thus implicitly intended to limit the
President's removal power."l7
On their face, the restrictions Congress placed on the Pres-
ident's authority to remove special prosecutors appear to vio-
late the Court's interpretation of article II, section 2, clause 2.
Since it is fairly clear that special prosecutors are purely exec-
utive officers, the Court's decisions in Myers and Humphrey's
Executor, which protect the President's removal authority in
relation to such officers, apparently forbid Congress from cir-
cumscribing the President's authority to dismiss them.118 A
more complete analysis reveals, however, that the rationale of
both Humphrey's Executor and Wiener supports Congress's ac-
CoRwiN, supra note 66, at 56-62. The Supreme Court later adopted a similar
analysis in Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935). See in-
fra text accompanying notes 112-13.
111. The Supreme Court also concluded in Myers that the Tenure of Office
Act of 1867, see supra note 107, was invalid in so far as it prohibited presidential
removal of executive officers without senate consent. 272 U.S. at 176.
112. 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
113. Id. at 629. The Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41, 42,
(Supp. IV 1980), stated that "[any commissioner may be removed by the Pres-
ident for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office."
114. 295 U.S. at 631.
115. 357 U.S. 349 (1958).
116. Id. at 355.
117. Id. at 353-55.
118. See supra text accompanying notes 110-13.
[Vol. 66:963
SPECIAL PROSECUTOR ACT
tions. In these cases, the Court sought to ensure the indepen-
dence which Congress gave the appointees and which was
necessary for their effectiveness." 9 The character of the spe-
cial prosecutor's office under the Act is, in this respect, like the
Federal Trade Commission or the War Claims Commission.
Unrestricted power of the President to remove a special prose-
cutor would completely defeat the independence of the office
which Congress clearly sought to achieve. Moreover, this ar-
rangement promotes presidential compliance with article H,
section 3 because the President is in a better position to "take
Care that the Laws be faithfully executed"' 2 0 if Congress limits
presidential power to remove a special prosecutor.121 With un-
qualified power to remove the special prosecutor, the President
could inhibit the law enforcement process any time an officer of
the executive branch became vulnerable to prosecution for an
alleged crime. 2 2
IV. PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE
When the current Act terminates in 1983, Congress will
have several alternatives. It can allow the Act to expire as the
present administration strongly recommends. 123 It can reenact
the law as written, which no one recommends. Or it can reen-
act the law in an amended form. One can make a strong argu-
ment for having no special prosecutor law. Historically, the
executive branch has appointed special prosecutors without
specific legislation, either on its own initiative124 or after con-
gressional request by joint resolution.12 5 Since Watergate, how-
ever, Congress has not been content to rely on this ad hoc
119. See supra text accompanying notes 114-17.
120. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
121. L TRME, AMERICAN CONSTrrTTIONAL LAw 191 (1978).
122. See, e.g., Nader v. Bork, 366 F. Supp. 104, 107-08 (D.D.C. 1973) (Special
Prosecutor Cox was fired when he insisted that the White House comply with a
judicial order to produce tapes.).
123. Hearings, supra note 43, at 116 (Statement of Rudolph Giuliani).
124. For example, the Attorney General appointed Watergate Special Prose-
cutor Archibald Cox under general authority derived from 5 U.S.C. § 301 (1976)
and 28 U.S.C. §§ 509-10 (1976 & Supp. 11 1979). See 38 Fed. Reg. 14,688 (1973)
(codified at 28 C.F.R. § 0.37, repealed, 38 Fed. Reg. 29,466 (1974)). See also Hear-
ings, supra note 43, at 126 (Statement of Rudolph Giuliani) (appointment of
nonstatutory special counsel Paul Curran regarding the Carter warehouse
investigation).
125. For example, the 68th Congress directed President Coolidge to appoint
a special counsel to prosecute the Teapot Dome scandal. S.J. Res. 54, 68th
Cong., 2d Sess., 43 Stat. 5 (1924). President Coolidge appointed Atlee Pomer-
ene, a former Senator and a Democrat, and Owen J. Roberts, a Republican (and
later a Supreme Court Justice). See generally H.. REP. No. 1307, 95th Cong.,
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process; special prosecutor legislation now seems to be a last-
ing legacy.
Anticipating that Congress might reject its proposal to al-
low the Act to die, the Reagan administration has submitted a
summary of proposed amendments which, it says, "would pre-
serve the core purpose of the statute while eliminating many of
the problems."126 These amendments would empower the At-
torney General, or in the event he or she is disqualified, a Dep-
uty Attorney General, to appoint special prosecutors and to
remove them for "good cause."' 27 The amendments would
cover only the President, Vice-President, Attorney General,
and other persons who fall under a "catch-all" provision. 2 8 Fi-
nally, the administration would amend the Act to remove or to
ameliorate many of the practical difficulties which this Article
has discussed.129
The principal fault of this proposal is its failure adequately
to preserve the basic purpose of the statute. Congress based
the original Act upon the premise that the executive branch
cannot properly decide whether or how closely to investigate it-
self.130 Thus Congress circumscribed the Attorney General's
discretion to appoint a special prosecutor. The present admin-
istration's proposal would eliminate these protections against a
conflict of interest in the executive branch, returning substan-
tial power and discretion in appointing a special prosecutor to
the Attorney General.131 Moreover, the proposal requires the
Attorney General to appoint a special prosecutor only to inves-
tigate allegations of criminal conduct made against the three
2d Sess. 2 n.3 (1978); B. NOGGLE, TEAPOT DoME; O. AND PoLICS IN THE 1920's
(1962).
126. Hearings, supra note 43, at 128 (Statement of Rudolph Giuliani).
127. Id. at 123-24.
128. Id. at 126-27. The administration's catch-all provision would "cover any
other government official, or private person, regardless of position where, be-
cause of a close familial, personal, business or political relationship, the Attor-
ney General determines that it would create a significant appearance of conflict
of interest if such person were investigated criminally by the Department of
Justice." Id. at 127.
129. Id. at 127-28. See supra notes 49-61 and accompanying text.
130. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
131. Acknowledging that the Attorney General may at times face a conflict
of interest, the Reagan administration's plan turns the appointment decision
over to the Deputy Attorney General in certain situations. Id. at 123-24. This,
however, does not avoid conflict of interest problems. The Deputy Attorney
General, as another high-ranking member of the administration, also has a di-
vided loyalty. Thus the Deputy Attorney General confronts the same conflict of
interest as the Attorney General.
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top executive branch officials. 132 There would be no independ-
ent investigation of allegations made against lower executive
officials, although the Attorney General may also face serious
conflict of interest problems in these cases.
The administration's plan reflects a misunderstanding of
the recusance theory underlying the Act. Explaining the plan
to a Senate committee, Associate Attorney General Giuliani
stated that "the Department recognizes that even if there is no
actual conflict of interest in most situations, many people feel
that the appearance of conflict alone is enough to justify the
statutory Special Prosecutor procedures."133 This "appearance
of conflict" problem has become the focus of the administra-
tion's proposal. Its "catch-all" provision would authorize the
Attorney General to appoint a special prosecutor to investigate
any person, whether or not a government official, if the Attor-
ney General "determines that it would create a significant ap-
pearance of a conflict of interest.' 3 4
Reliance on the "appearance of conflict" standard does an
injustice to the Act.135 Use of the standard distracts attention
from the real issue, actual conflicts of interest. A similar doc-
trine, the "appearance of impropriety" standard, has fallen into
disfavor as a workable standard of professional conduct in the
analogous area of legal ethics.136 A more precise rule, like that
in the American Bar Association's Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility, which prohibits a lawyer from representing a cli-
132. The proposal's "catch-all" provision might cover other officials. See
supra note 128. Yet Mr. Giuliani suggests that the catch-all provision would
"serve to narrow some of the presently overbroad categories" of the Act, indi-
cating that in his view the provision would be rarely invoked. Hearings, supra
note 43, at 127 (Statement of Rudolph Giuliani).
133. Id. at 118.
134. See supra note 128.
135. Congress did consult an analogous standard of the Model Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility, which states that "a lawyer should avoid even the ap-
pearance of impropriety," MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONsmMrrY
Canon 9 (1979), in drafting the Special Prosecutor provisions. See S. REP. No.
170, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1977). The Attorney General's divided loyalty, and
the Department of Justice's general difficulty in investigating alleged criminal
activity by high-level government officials, however, were equally compelling
justifications for the Act. Id. at 5.
136. The latest version of the new proposed Model Rules of Professional
Conduct rejects Canon 9's "appearance of impropriety" concept as unworkable.
MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 notes at 51-53 (Proposed Fi-
nal Draft 1981). See also Kramer, The Appearance of Impropriety Under Canon
9: A Study of the Federal Judicial Process Applied to Lawyers, 65 MmN. L.
REV. 243 (1980) ("Appearance of impropriety" is too dangerous and vague a
standard to serve as a foundation for guiding professional conduct, and should
be dropped from the Model Code).
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ent "if the exercise of his independent professional judgment
... is likely to be adversely affected by reason of the represen-
tation of another client,"' 37 would be more appropriate. The
special prosecutor provisions are best understood as a congres-
sional recognition that the Attorney General's loyalty to the
President is a disability whenever the Attorney General must
decide whether to investigate or prosecute members of the
administration.138
Benjamin Civiletti, while Attorney General in the Carter
administration, also proposed changes in the Act.139 He sug-
gested maintaining a system of court-appointed, temporary
special prosecutors, but removing many less important White
House officials from the Act's coverage.140 In addition, he
would require special prosecutors to adhere to Justice Depart-
ment policy.141 Finally, Civiletti would give the Attorney Gen-
eral more discretion in determining whether to refer matters to
special prosecutors, 142 allowing the Attorney General not to re-
fer matters to special prosecutors if he or she determines that
the Department's information, although "specific,"'143 is not
"sufficient to constitute a reasonable ground to investigate."1 44
137. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSMLrY DR 5-105(B) (1979).
The disciplinary rule reads in its entirety as follows:
A lawyer shall not continue multiple employment if the exercise of his
independent professional judgment in behalf of a client will be or is
likely to be adversely affected by his representation of another client,
or if it would be likely to involve him in representing differing interests,
except to the extent permitted under DR 5-105(C).
"Differing interest" is then defined as "includ[ing] every interest that will ad-
versely affect either the judgment or the loyalty of a lawyer to a client, whether
it be a conflicting, inconsistent, diverse, or other interest." Id. Definitions (1).
Thus, the law was moving away from "conflict of interest" as a phrase of art
as far back as 1970, when the present Code was adopted. The final draft of the
new proposed Model Rule of Professional Conduct returns to use of the phrase
"conflict of interest," but makes it clear that the concept is to have, in general,
as broad an application as the "differing interest," standard in the existing
Code. See MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIoNAL CoNDucT Rule 1.7 (Proposed Final
Draft 1981).
138. The present Justice Department clearly does not recognize actual con-
flict of interest as a great problem. Associate Attorney General Giuliani frankly
asserted: "The assumption upon which the special prosecutor law is pre-
mised-that the Department of Justice should not be trusted to investigate or
prosecute certain federal offenses-is simply unfounded." Hearings, supra note
43, at 118 (Statement of Rudolph Giuliani).
139. Civiletti, supra note 56, at 1051-56; Hearings, supra note 43, at 9-12.
140. Civiletti, supra note 56, at 1053-54.
141. Id. at 1055-56.
142. Id.
143. 28 U.S.C. § 591(a) (Supp. I1 1979). See supra notes 49-50 and accompa-
nying text.
144. Civiletti, supra note 56, at 1054.
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The Attorney General could also conclude the matter if he or
she could "say with assurance in a report to the court that the
offense is not one that the Department would investigate or
prosecute under the standards that govern investigatory and
prosecutorial decisions in ordinary cases."'145
The discretion given to the Attorney General under Civi-
letti's proposal exposes his plan to the same criticism that ap-
plies to the Reagan administration's proposal, though to a
much lesser degree. Loyalty to the President and other high-
level executive officials adversely affects the Attorney Gen-
eral's decision whether the Justice Department standards com-
mand investigation or prosecution of the President or
presidential appointees. Congress clearly felt that giving
prosecutorial discretion in such instances to the Attorney Gen-
eral forces the Attorney General to represent differing inter-
ests.14 6 Civiletti's goal is to minimize both the problem of
premature, unwarranted public controversy endemic to ap-
pointment of a temporary special prosecutor, and the particular
unfairness of generating this controversy if the charges would
not be prosecuted in an ordinary case. But to achieve this com-
mendable goal, his proposal would pay an unnecessarily high
price, because it would give the Attorney General more discre-
tion than Congress found acceptable.
A subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Governmen-
tal Affairs, chaired by Senator Cohen, issued a report last Octo-
ber also proposing changes in the Act.147 The report, in
145. Id. at 1056.
146. S. REP. No. 170, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 (1977).
147. REPORT, supra note 48. Other proposals surfaced during the Senate
committee hearings. Senator Rudman suggested a two-tier system. The Presi-
dent, Vice-President, and possibly Cabinet officers would continue to be cov-
ered under the present Act. All other officials would fall under a different sort
of catch-all provision. When a non-Cabinet official is being investigated, any
complaint of conflict of interest lodged with the Attorney General would re-
quire assigning the case to a U.S. Attorney (in any jurisdiction) for independ-
ent investigation. Both the Attorney General and the Deputy Attorney General
would then be prohibited from issuing a nolle prosequi in the case. Hearings,
supra note 43, at 108-09. While such a plan would assure prosecutorial indepen-
dence from the Attorney General, it would still place investigation of executive
officials in the most politically-minded offices of the Justice Department.
United States Attorneys frequently are heavily indebted to their Senators and
the political process. Hearings on S. 2803, supra note 11, at 74 (testimony of
Richard Kleindeinst, former Attorney General). See also Remarks of former
Attorney General Bell at the University of Virginia Miller Center Conference
on the President, the Attorney General, and the Department of Justice (Jan. 4-
5,1980), reprinted in D. MEADOR, THE PRESIDENT, THE ATroRNEY GENERAL, AND
THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 139 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Conference].
Lloyd Cutler, Counsel to President Carter, testified before the subcommit-
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essence, suggests that Congress adopt some of the recommen-
dations made by the Reagan Administration and by former At-
torney General Civiletti. Under the subcommittee's proposal, a
special prosecutor would be appointed by the court only when
the Attorney General "has reasonable grounds to believe that
investigation or prosecution is warranted."148 The report also
recommends constricting the coverage of the Act, principally
by eliminating coverage of those White House officials who are
not "truly senior" and hence not "close to presidential or Jus-
tice Department decision-making." 149 Rather than adopt a
"catch-all" provision, the subcommittee would add a provision
covering only the President's family. 5 0
The subcommittee's proposal, by giving broad discretion to
the Attorney General to decide whether to seek court appoint-
ment of a special prosecutor, raises the same problem as the
proposals of the Reagan Administration and Mr. Civiletti.' 51
Further, the subcommittee report bases its conclusion that the
present Act's coverage is overinclusive on the premise that in-
vestigation of executive officials whose positions are generally
unknown to the public or remote from the Justice Department
can pose no danger of real or perceived conflict of interest.152
Thus, it reasons, the cost and publicity attached to a special
prosecutor's appointment should be an ordeal that only very
senior officials should bear15 3 This Article concurs with the
subcommittee's concern over the problems of unfair adverse
tee and suggested several changes similar to the proposals discussed supra.
Mr. Cutler expressed a preference for returning some prosecutorial authority to
the executive branch, and for regularizing the special prosecutor process. He
suggested that a presidentially-appointed "blue ribbon panel" establish a pool
of three potential special prosecutors. Hearings, supra note 43, at 47, 54-55.
Compare this Article's proposal for a presidentially-appointed special prosecu-
tor, infra notes 156-71 and accompanying text.
148. REPORT, supra note 48, at 49.
149. Id. at 31-34. The 'truly senior officials" are defined as those holding ex-
ecutive level 11 positions or above. Id. at 33.
150. Id. at 35. Further, the subcommittee recommends that the subject of a
special prosecutor investigation be authorized to apply to the special court for
attorneys fees, id. at 27-28; that the Attorney General be required to conduct a
preliminary investigation only when he or she receives "specific information
sufficient to constitute a reasonable ground to investigate," id. at 42; that the
name of the office be changed to "independent counsel," id. at 29; that the
length of time after resignation from office a covered official can remain subject
to the provisions be reduced, id. at 35-38; and that the standard of removal be
changed to allow the Attorney General to remove the special prosecutor for
"good cause." Id. at 54.
151. See supra notes 128-32, 139-4 and accompanying text.




publicity.154 The report's assessment of the Act's proper cover-
age is less persuasive, however. Less senior officials in the
White House may not be well known to the public, yet they
have in the past posed serious conflict of interest problems
once they were accused of committing crimes. In such cases,
the Attorney General's judgment is disabled by the political
consequences of the investigation for the President. 5 5
Each of the above proposals contains valuable suggestions,
but they either fall short of correcting the problems of the Act,
or they fail to preserve its underlying purpose. This Article
suggests a different approach. 56 Specifically, it proposes that
Congress consider changing the Act to require presidential ap-
pointment of a special prosecutor, with the rank and title of As-
sistant Attorney General, for a term which would end on
January 20 following each presidential election year.'5 7 Special
prosecutors could hold office for up to four years. 5 8 They
would be nominated by the President and confirmed by the
Senate. 5 9 The President could not nominate anyone who was
a member of the same political party as the President, had held
a presidential appointment made either by the President in of-
fice or by his or her immediate predecessor if of the same polit-
154. See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
155. Recall the Watergate experience which prompted the Special Prosecu-
tor provisions. E. Howard Hunt and Jeb Stuart Magruder, for example, were
less senior White House officials who were implicated in the early stages of the
Watergate investigation. The subcommittee proposes that the coverage of the
Act be limited to officials at or above executive level I. REPORT, supra note 48,
at 33. Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 591(b) (3) (Supp. 1979) (covers White House officials at or
above level IV). Hunt was Consultant to the White House and Magruder was
Deputy Director of White House Communications. C. BERNSTEIN & B. WOOD-
WARD, ALL THE PRESIDENT'S MEN 9 (1974). Apparently, neither of these posi-
tions would be compensated at or above level 11. See Hearings, supra note 43,
at 277-80. Nevertheless, political pressure from the White House certainly af-
fected the investigation of Hunt and Magruder's Watergate activities. Id. at
166-68 (Testimony of Steven Rosenfeld); see S. REP. No. 981, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
35-36, 44-46 (1974).
156. An appendix to the Article details the special prosecutor provisions of
the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 as they would appear under this
approach.
157. Proposed § 593(a), in fra in Appendix.
158. The President and Senate could reappoint special prosecutors every
four years at the expiration of their term in office, but only if they meet certain
qualifications for office. See Proposed § 593(a), infra in Appendix.
The concept of a special prosecutor appointed by the President, with Sen-
ate confirmation, to serve a fixed term has been suggested since the Act was
adopted in 1978. Senator Weicker introduced a bill to create a Public Prosecu-
tor in the Justice Department who would serve a six year term. S. 2272, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CONG. REC. S1168-77 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1980). See infra note
165.
159. Proposed § 593(a), infra in Appendix.
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ical party as the incumbent President, or had campaigned for
the election of any presidential candidate during the most re-
cent election.160
This proposal would require the Attorney General to trans-
fer to the special prosecutor any information, whether or not
specific, suggesting that any person hiolding office in the execu-
tive branch at or above level IV had violated any federal crimi-
nal law other than a petty offense.161 The special prosecutor,
upon receipt of this information, would be solely responsible
for further investigation of that person and, if warranted, for
prosecution, without interference from any other official in the
executive branch.162 The President could remove the special
prosecutor only for the grounds stated in the present Act.163
The proposal would require the special prosecutor to comply
with all the written enforcement policies of the Department of
Justice.164
Under this proposal, the Assistant Attorney General-spe-
cial prosecutor would also direct the Department of Justice
Public Integrity Section.165 This Section is now an integral part
of the Criminal Division in the Department of Justice. It has
jurisdiction over all federal offenses "involving public and insti-
tutional corruption"16 6 in the executive, legislative, and judicial
branches. In supervising the Public Integrity Section, the As-
sistant Attorney General-special prosecutor would be
subordinate to the Attorney General. Activities pursued as
special prosecutor would not, however, be under the Attorney
160. Id.
161. Proposed § 592, infra in Appendix.
162. Proposed § 594(a), infra in Appendix. The proposal retains the Attor-
ney General's control over wiretapping and other undercover procedures man-
dated by 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (1976 & Supp. I 1979). It does, however, eliminate
current sections 594(b) through 594(e) as unnecessary in the proposed scheme,
since the special prosecutor and staff will be part of the Department of Justice.
It also changes § 594(f) in important respects. See infra text accompanying
note 164.
163. Proposed § 596(a), in fra in Appendix.
164. Proposed § 594(b), infra in Appendix.
165. Senator Weicker's Public Prosecutor bill would have given the Public
Prosecutor authority over criminal investigations concerning members of Con-
gress and many of their employees. Moreover, the Public Prosecutor would ex-
ercise this authority independent of the Attorney General's supervision. S.
2272, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CONG. REc. S1170-71, S1175 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1980).
166. Department of Justice Press Release (Jan. 14, 1976) (on fie at the Min-
nesota Law Review). The press release seems to be the only definition printed





The central objective of this proposal is to preserve the in-
dependence of the special prosecutor while restructuring the
office to avoid the pitfalls of a temporary, specialized process.
One can amend the Act to address the concerns for workability,
fairness, and constitutionality outlined earlier, without destroy-
ing Congress's recusance theory or reintroducing Attorney
General discretion.
This proposal clearly guards the recusance theory underly-
ing the current Act. Under the proposal, Presidents would ap-
point special prosecutors, but would do so at the beginning of
their terms, under no pressure arising from pending allegations
against one of their appointees. Moreover, the proposal would
limit the President's freedom to choose those who might
closely share the President's political ties.168 Once in office, the
special prosecutor would have complete independence to inves-
tigate and to prosecute allegations against covered parties.169
Finally, the President could only remove the special prosecutor
for extraordinary impropriety.? 0 As Congress has recognized,
this protects special prosecutors from presidential pressure
and allows them to make decisions independently.' 7 '
The proposal also solves the problems of workability inher-
ent under the current Act. Like other proposals, this alterna-
tive eliminates the need for the Attorney General to decide
whether the information he or she receives, alleging a federal
criminal offense by an executive officer, is "specific," or is "so
unsubstantiated" that it does not warrant referral to a special
prosecutor.? 2 The proposed special prosecutor would receive
167. The only substantive changes in the Act not discussed in the text are:
1) The elimination of 28 U.S.C. § 595(b) (Supp. 1I 1979), regulating a spe-
cial prosecutor's reports to the court. Since this proposal abolishes court ap-
pointment of special prosecutors, it also eliminates the need for these reports.
Subsection (a), which gives special prosecutors authority to make activity re-
ports and requires that such reports be sent to Congress is retained, however;
2) the elimination ofid. § 595(e), giving members of Congress authority to
request the Attorney General to "apply for the appointment of a special prose-
cutor." This provision is unnecessary since there will always be a special prose-
cutor in office; and
3) the limitation of coverage to principal officers of principal national cam-
paign committees seeking the election or reelection of the President under id.
§ 591(b) (6), removing insignificant campaign committee officers.
168. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
169. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
170. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
171. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.




and decide whether to investigate any information that a fed-
eral offense had been committed, irrespective of whether the
allegations were specific or substantiated after a preliminary
investigation. This Assistant Attorney General would thus pro-
cess allegations in a regular manner, free of interpretive
difficulties.
This Article's proposal would also eliminate one of the ma-
jor problems of the current Act-the unfairness of treating alle-
gations against relatively high level government officials
differently from allegations against private citizens and persons
not covered by the Act. By specializing the procedures to avoid
presidential conflict of interest, the existing statute invites pub-
lic controversy and thus severely weakens the protections of
the innocent. 73 The proposed amendments would require the
special prosecutor to adhere to Department of Justice enforce-
ment policies, 74 ensuring that those whom the Attorney Gen-
eral would not ordinarily investigate or prosecute would
receive no different treatment from the special prosecutor.
Moreover, the proposal would minimize the publicity inherent
in the current two step appointment procedure, in which both
the Attorney General and a special court must act before a spe-
cial prosecutor assumes responsibility for a case.
Further, this Article's approach would broaden the cover-
age of the Act.'75 The existing statute applies to relatively few
high level presidential appointees. 7 6 The proposed amend-
ments apply to all presidential appointees at level IV or
above.' 77 This would eliminate the inconsistency of using ex-
173. See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
174. Proposed § 594(b), infra in Appendix.
175. There has been criticism even of the breadth of the current Act's cover-
age. Hearings, supra note 43, at 124-27 (Statement of Rudolph Giuliani); Civi-
letti, supra note 56, at 1053-54. This proposal obviates these objections, because
it eliminates the workability and fairness problems of the Act. This proposal
imposes no special burdens on officials covered by the Act.
176. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. The suggested Act proposes
to retain section 591(b) (5)-(6). For criticism of the inclusion of persons cov-
ered by subsection (5) of the existing Act, see Hearings, supra note 43, at 124;
Civiletti, supra note 56, at 1054.
177. Proposed § 591(a) (2), infra in Appendix. The Act would also cover em-
ployees in the executive office compensated at level IV or above. Proposed
§ 591(a) (3), infra in Appendix. At the end of the Carter Administration, be-
tween 200 and 240 persons were covered by the Act. Hearings, supra note 43, at
124; Civiletti, supra note 56, at 1054. This Article's proposal would cover approx-
imately 385 additional persons, including all deputy, under and assistant cabi-
net secretaries, the chairperson and members of most agencies, the general
counsel of cabinet departments, and- several other government officials ap-
pointed by the President. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 5312-15 (Supp. IV 1980). The exact
number of people covered by the Act varies because of changes in the size of
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isting special prosecutor procedures against alleged crimes by,
for example, the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the
Office of Legal Policy, who directs less than 30 attorneys, while
not using the special prosecutor procedures against the Gen-
eral Counsel of several departments and agencies, who direct
two or three times that number of attorneys.178 In addition, the
proposal includes a "catch-all" provision similar to the proposal
that Associate Attorney General Rudolph Giuliani suggested to
Congress. This provision broadens section 591 to cover allega-
tions against anyone, even non-government officials, if a federal
criminal investigation of that person, conducted through nor-
mal Department of Justice channels, could involve a conflict of
interest. The recusance theory of the present Act arguably de-
mands that an independent prosecutor investigate charges
against relatives or business associates of the President or At-
torney General.
If adopted, this Article's proposed changes would largely
remove doubts as to the Act's constitutionality. The proposal
would require the President to appoint the special prosecutor
with Senate confirmation. 7 9 By making the special prosecutor
an "officer" and not an "inferior officer," the amendments avoid
the problem of court participation in the appointment process
and thus do not violate either the separation of powers doctrine
or the appointment and removal clause of the Constitution.180
Moreover, the proposal requires the special prosecutor to ad-
here to the policies of the Department of Justice in enforcing
the criminal law, thus protecting even further the President's
control over purely executive functions. Finally, the amend-
ments adopt the same constitutionally valid removal standards
the current Act uses.1 81
Five possible objections to this proposal deserve discus-
sion. First, the proposal would bar those who belong to the
President's political party, who have recently campaigned for
the White House staff vacancies in covered offices, and application of the Act
to covered people after they have resigned from a covered office. See Hearings,
supra note 43, at 268-69, 273-80.
178. The statistics come from a telephone interview with Ms. Appenzellar,
Librarian of the Department of Justice (Jan. 27, 1982).
179. Proposed § 593(a), infra in Appendix.
180. See supra text accompanying notes 62-122.
181. Proposed § 596(a), infra in Appendix. Because the proposal would re-
quire the special prosecutor to comply with Department of Justice enforcement
policies, intentional noncompliance with these policies that results in the in-
dictment of a person who clearly would not have been prosecuted if he ol she
were not covered by the Act would constitute "extraordinary impropriety" and
be sufficient grounds for removal
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any presidential candidate, or who have already served the
President in some other office, from being the special prosecu-
tor.182 These disqualifications would undoubtedly bar able law-
yers from consideration. Nevertheless, the disqualifications are
necessary to preserve the original theory of the Act. The Presi-
dent cannot be allowed to appoint a political supporter or asso-
ciate as special prosecutor. In Congress's judgment, the
Attorney General has a serious and sometimes dangerous disa-
bility if called upon to investigate crimes that associates hold-
ing federal office allegedly committed.183 Creating the same
disability in a new special prosecutor's office would wholly de-
feat the purpose of the Act.
A second possible objection concerns a problem which one
could term the "grandstanding," or "loose cannon" effect.
Under the current Act, a special prosecutor is a temporary ap-
pointee who only has authority to investigate allegations of a
single, specified crime or a well-defined group of related crimes.
Under the proposal suggested here, the special prosecutor
would investigate and prosecute all allegations of non-petty
crimes by presidential appointees, 8 4 could hold office for four
years, and could not be fired for anything less than gross in-
competence or misconduct. One can conceive of a politically
ambitious special prosecutor of the opposite political party run-
ning wild.185 The proposal, however, invokes several safe-
guards to prevent politically motivated prosecutions. Since the
President must appoint someone from the opposite political
party, the President likely would be careful to select a person
of high legal ability with a reputation for integrity. The Presi-
dent also may not appoint a person who has recently mani-
fested political interests and ambitions by campaigning for a
presidential candidate. Finally, the special prosecutor's staff
would consist of careerists, 86 who tend to disfavor political
grandstanding. 8 7
Former Deputy Attorney General Harold Tyler raised two
more objections to certain provisions of this plan while testify-
182. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
183. HI. REP. No. 1307, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-6 (1978).
184. Proposed § 591(a), infra in Appendix. The prosecutor would also in-
vestigate and prosecute all crimes involving persons covered by the Act's catch-
all provision. I&
185. See REPORT, supra note 48, at 51; Hearings, supra note 43, at 132-33 (tes-
timony of Arthur Christy).
186. The special prosecutor's staff will be selected under the procedures
used to select all Department of Justice employees.
187. Remarks of R. Dixon, Jr., Conference, supra note 147, at 105.
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ing in 1976 to the Senate Judiciary Committee on the proposed
Watergate Reorganization and Reform Act of 1976.188 Tyler op-
posed the creation of a new assistant attorney general and a
new division in the Justice Department to deal with alleged
crimes by government officers or employees. He said that such
legislation would not only divide responsibility for the enforce-
ment of criminal laws,189 but would also "invite jurisdictional
conflicts" between the proposed Division of Government
Crimes and the existing Criminal Division.190
Although Tyler's first argument seems forceful, a division
of responsibility in this area is necessary and beneficial. The
special prosecutor must have independence. Moreover, crime
in government may require a different approach and new tech-
niques in comparison to those used in investigating crime
outside government, such as organized crime and racketeering.
Finally, the history of criminal law enforcement in the Depart-
ment of Justice belies the alleged, evil of divided law enforce-
ment responsibility. For many years, both the Antitrust and
Tax Divisions have had jurisdiction over criminal violations of
the tax and antitrust laws.191 Enforcement of those laws appar-
ently has not suffered from the ills of divided responsibility.
One can raise Tyler's second argument, that 'Jurisdictional
conflicts" would arise between the new Office and the Criminal
Division, every time the Department of Justice creates any new
Division, Bureau, or Office. Indeed, the Offices of United States
Attorneys, each headed by a presidentially-appointed prosecu-
tor, have been an intermittent source of division of responsibil-
ity in federal criminal law enforcement and of conflict with the
Attorney General since the founding of the Republic.192 A new
Assistant Attorney General in charge of government crimes
would likely create no more jurisdictional conflicts than the ex-
isting situation creates. Moreover, a statute would clearly de-
fine the new special prosecutor's authority, and would thus
minimize jurisdictional conflicts.
The last criticism of the proposed amendments focuses on
the two roles that the new Assistant Attorney General-special
188. Hearings on S. 495 Amended, supra note 15, at 2-5 (statement of Harold
R. Tyler, Jr., Deputy Attorney General).
189. Id. at 3-4.
190. Id.
191. 28 C.F.R. §§ 0.40-.41, 0.70-.71 (1980).
192. J. EISENSTEIN, COUNSEL FOR THE UNn!ED STATES 10, 57-58 (1978); Buck-
ley, The Department of Justice-Its Origin, Development and Present Day Or-
ganization, 5 B.U.L. REV. 177, 180 (1925).
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prosecutor must assume. As a special prosecutor he or she
would be independent from the Attorney General; as Assistant
Attorney General in charge of the Public Integrity Section, he
or she would be subordinate to the Attorney General. Since
the volume of work as Assistant Attorney General would prob-
ably exceed the officer's workload as special prosecutor by fifty
or one hundred to one, 193 the special prosecutor may uncon-
sciously develop close ties to the Justice Department that will
threaten the prosecutor's independence.
This divided loyalties objection, however, is based in part
on a misconception of the way in which the Department of Jus-
tice works. The Solicitor General, Assistant Attorneys General,
and United States Attorneys have far more independence than
is generally realized.194 Although the Attorney General is fre-
quently described as the top of a pyramid, 95 it is unusual for a
matter to reach the top. Assistant Attorneys General usually
make all the final decisions on the disposition of cases.1 96 It is
their job to fend off Presidents and Attorneys General when
they wish to intercede on behalf of influential persons under in-
vestigation.197 As a final safeguard, however, the proposed stat-
utory disqualifications for the special prosecutor should
eliminate any perceived pro-administration bias. The actual
impartiality and courage of that officeholder would depend on
those attributes of competence and character that defy defini-
193. There have been an estimated 10 filings under the special prosecutor
provisions. See supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text. Former Attorney
General Griffin Bell estimated that in 1980 there were "probably 1000 to 1200
public officials under investigation" for official crimes. Conference, supra note
147, at 93 (remarks of Attorney General Griffin Bell). The Public Integrity Sec-
tion investigates official crimes in all three branches of the federal government.
See Press Release, supra note 166, at 1.
194. Conference, supra note 147, at 89-90, 132, 141, 145 (1980).
195. The Attorney General's role has been described, for example, as that of
"chief lawyer for the nation." Id. at 130.
196. Thurman Arnold, when Assistant Attorney General in charge of the
Antitrust Division, said "the first rule is never tell the Attorney General any-
thing." Id. at 141.
197. As Justice William Rehnquist wrote when he was Assistant Attorney
General for the Office of Legal Counsel, "[t]he plain fact of the matter is that
any President, and any Attorney General, wants his immediate underlings to
be not only competent attorneys, but to be politically and philosophically at-
tuned to the policies of the administration." Rehnquist, The Old Order
Changethv The Department of Justice Under John Mitchell, 12 ARm. L. REv. 251,
252 (1970). See also Leonard v. Douglas, 321 F.2d 749, 751-52 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
For a discussion of responses of Assistant Attorneys General and Solicitors
General to presidential and Attorney General influence and attempted influ-
ence in specific cases see Conference, supra note 147, at 85-89, 132.
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tion, because ultimately quality appointments depend on the
wisdom and judgment of presidents and their advisors.
V. CONCLUSION
The Watergate controversy instilled in Congress a desire to
remove the dangers of executive self-investigation and self-
prosecution. When the special prosecutor provisions of the
Ethics in Government Act expire in 1983 Congress must decide
whether and how to continue to pursue this goal.198 To elimi-
nate the Attorney General's potential conflict of interest there
must be some form of special prosecutor legislation. The Act is
unacceptable, however, in its present form. In addition to its
constitutional difficulties, the Act is both unworkable and un-
fair. The several reforms that have been previously suggested
attempt to solve these concerns. Yet the Reagan administra-
tion's, Civiletti's, and the Senate Subcommittee's proposals
give the Attorney General too much discretion, which defeats
the recusance theory underlying the Act.
By adopting the proposal detailed in this Article, Congress
would not only maintain the independence of the special prose-
cutor, but would also eliminate the workability, fairness, and
constitutional problems that burden the current Act. Passage
of these amendments would guard against the problems re-
vealed during Watergate while providing a more effective and
equitable method to investigate and to prosecute crimes com-
mitted by executive officers or their close associates.
198. Senators Cohen, Levin, and Rudman recently introduced S. 2059, a bill
to continue the Act in an amended form. S. 2059, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128
CONG. REC. S359-61 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 1982). The bill would essentially enact the
subcommittee proposal discussed supra at notes 147-55 and accompanying text.
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APPENDIX
Proposed Revisions in the Special Prosecutor Provisions of the
Ethics in Government Act (28 U.S.C. §§ 49, 591-598
(Supp. I1l 1979)).*
§ 49. Assignment of judges to division to appoint special prosecutors [Delete].
§ 591. Applicability of provisions of this chapter
. 'Uvofu t his chpe wlojreven. the Attorney Elenial ±e.ives 0pe~ifv ir.
iotlJioniU. that cy of t h prons~ dvo,..Lbp in ouboe1.Liu (b)o, ut his sectLui
has committed a violaon Of Ut..L1Y federt crimina l U°w oth er tn viviuto
constiuting petty offense4.
tb The persons referred to in s.a.bcioni (a) .f tis0 section 592 of this ti-
tle are-
"(- (a) the President and Vice President;
(2)" (b) any individual serving in a position listed in sections
5312 through 5315 of title 5;
(t- (c) any individual working in the Executive Office of the
PresidenF-aid compensated at a rate not less than the annual rate of
basic pay provided for level IV of the Executive Schedule under sec-
tion 5315 of title 5;
(4) u y individual w hoki f held any offe opusti mio decibe
niatn d at a rateph rL l(__ tha thugh "(4-)l-t of ti ubseoti uvided
t iuen yo otir Exeuve SLhd t Under sect peio 5 3H lt prile 5, aruj
Assigrsint Attorey ce i Dcrecdint f resent1 ias ffi the
Dputly pirc te inuen,. at Preident;, ad tir eoinmwonel of In-
Lt±r±al Relvenum,
(_ (d) any individual who held any office or position described
in any of paragraphs elet (a) through -l (c) of this subsection during
the incumbency of the President or durin the period the last preced-
ing President held office, if such preceding President was of the same
political party as the incumbent President; mid
#(i) (e) any principal officer of the principal national campaign
committee seeking the election or reelection of the PresidentL- and
(f) any other person, investigation of whom the Attorney General
determinies would, because of such person's close family, personal,
business, or political relationship with the President, Vice President, or
Attorney General, involve a conflict of interest if not investigated by
the Special Prosecutor.
§ 592. ApptiJI4UUII for appointmenL t f a specil prosutorLLL
Referrals of information to the special prosecutor
ta The Attorney General, upon receiving specific information that any of
the persons described in section 591fb of this title has eirgaged fir coiiduc de-
s,.affied ii section 591(a) o Uth tlw ide, sh~l ,ai onuc.,t;J fo aJLU pe i not to ex
ninety days, suchJ yzffrin1 firL.1LJJ1vy0L1i4L1UJ.. of themate as41 y, the ALLtally ElU
ar-l de insppropriate committed a violation of any Federal criminal law other
than a violation constituting a petty offense -shall refer said information to the
Special Prosecutor.
(b)-(f) [Delete].
* The sequence of the sections in the original Act has been retained
solely for ease in comparing the Act with the proposed changes. Crossed-out
words indicate deletions; underlined words indicate insertions.
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§ 593. Duties . Lh division of tL. cu,
Appointment of the special prosecutor
(a)-(e) [Delete].
(a) The Special Prosecutor shall be appointed by the President with the
advice and consent of the Senate for a term which shall end at noon on Janu-
ary 20 in each year following election of a President. No person shall be eligi-
ble for such appointment if such person
(1) has held any other office
(A) in the executive branch during the incumbency of the
President;
(B) in the Federal Government if such person was appointed
to that office by the incumbent President;
(2) is a member of the same political party as that of the incum-
bent President; or
(3) campaigned for any presidential candidate in the most recent
election.
A special prosecutor who is otherwise qualified may be reappointed by the
President.
(b) The Special Prosecutor shall have the rank and receive compensation
equal to that of an Assistant Attorney General under section 5315 of title 5.
§ 594. Authority and duties of a the special prosecutor
(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a the aSpecial
pProsecutor appo:ited t,. chapter shall have, with respet to all mat-
ters in such special prosecutor's prosecutorial jurisdiction established under
this chapter, full power and independent authority to exercise all investigative
and prosecutorial functions and powers of the Department of Justice, the Attor-
ney General, and any other officer or employee of the Department of Justice,
except that the Attorney General shall exercise direction or control as to those
matters that specifically require the Attorney General's personal action under
section 2516 of title 18. Such investigative and prosecutorial functions and pow-
ers shall include-
(1) conducting proceedings before grand juries and other
investigations;
(2) participating in court proceedings and engaging in any litiga-
tion, including civil and criminal matters, that such the zSpecial
pProsecutor deems necessary;
(3) appealing any decision of a court in any case or proceeding in
which such the sSpecial pProsecutor participates in an official capacity;
(4) reviewing all documentary evidence available from any
source;
(5) determining whether to contest the assertion of any testimo-
nial privilege;
(6) receiving appropriate national security clearances and, if nec-
essary, contesting in court (including, where appropriate, participating
in in camera proceedings) any claim of privilege or attempt to withhold
evidence on grounds of national security;
(7) making applications to any Federal court for a grant of immu-
nity to any witness, consistent with applicable statutory requirements,
or for warrants, subpoenas, or other court orders, and, for purposes of
sections 6003, 6004, and 6005 of title 18, exercising the authority vested
in a United States Attorney or the Attorney General;
(8) inspecting, obtaining, or using the original or a copy of any
tax return, in accordance with the applicable statutes and regulations,
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and, for purposes of section 6103 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,
and the regulations issued thereunder, exercising the powers vested in
a United States Attorney or the Attorney General; and
(9) initiating and conducting prosecutions in any court of compe-
tent jurisdiction, framing and signing indictments, filing informations,
and handling all aspects of any case in the name of the United States.
(b)-(e) [Delete].
(f(b) AThe sSpecial pProsecutor shall, to the extent tsu spei ,
p~o~u de s , 4 o te, comply with the written policies of the Depart-
ment of Justice respecting enforcement of the criminal laws;., provided such
policies were in effect at the time when the matter was referred to the Special
Prosecutor by the Attorney General.
§ 595. Reporting and congressional oversight
(a) A The sSpecial pProsecutor appointed under this chapter may make
public from time To time, and shall send to the Congress statements or reports
on the activities of such special prosecutor. These statements and reports shall
contain such information as such. the sSpecial pProsecutor deems appropriate.
(b) [Delete].
*(c)(b) A The sSpecial pProsecutor shall advise the House of Representa-
tives of-an-y su--s-tanial and cixdible information which such special prosecutor
receives that may constitute grounds for an impeachment. Nothing in this
chapter or section 49 of thi LiLle shall prevent the Congress or either House
thereof from obtaining information in the course of an impeachment
proceeding.
(d-)-(c) the appropriate committees of the Congress shall have oversight
jurisdiction with respect to the official conduct of my the sSpecial pProsecutor
.1epu, L d this chaptez, and such the sSpecial pProsecutor shall have the
duty to cooperate with the exercise of such 6v-ersight 'urisdiction.
(e) [Delete].
§ 596. Removal of the special prosecutor, Lrination of office
(a)f- A The sSpecial pProsecutor appointed tder .hs chaptei- may be
removed from ofce7,other than by impeachment and conviction, only by the
personal action of the 2ktto Gry ee President and only for extraordinary
impropriety, physical disability, mental incapacity, or any other condition that
substantially impairs the performance of such the ESpecial prosecutor's
duties.
-()-(b) If the Special Prosecutor is removed from office, the Attorney Gen-
eral shafpromptly submit to the divisiou of th cuuxt and the Committees on
the Judiciary of the Senate and the House of Representatives a report specify-
ing the facts found and the ultimate grounds for such removal. The committees
shall make available to the public such report, except that each committee
may, if necessary to protect the rights of any individual named in the report or
to prevent undue interference with any pending prosecution, delete or post-
pone publishing any or all of the report. The division of tie c t zn. ,,,elease
any or a11 of suchI repaorti d±ie s4uzze iU41Jmer as a Lep.U±Lt t:1tdbd U11 eJ siection
595 (b) (3) of dri title and trdez tire scurre iiaioniius as app~ly to tire i efie4~, Vf
U. iej.JJt UwdeL diaI b4eliu.
t#(c) A Special Prosecutor so removed may obtain judicial review of the
removaT-m a civil action commenced before the divisio of tir cmt United
States District Court for the District of Columbia and, if such removal was
based on error of law or fact, may obtain reinstatement or other appropriate re-
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§ 597. Relationship with Department of Justice
(a) Vazenever m ai in th L jusa~tvoil jurisdictin of a apeciol
Fpu0secauLv has been. accepted by a secial jpnustautoz tflfdlVJ sectionL . 9 4 (ej o
Lia tile, the DeptinLai lt of Justce, Hie ALLuttney GEieal, anid ail uth Office.s
caid emuplo~yees of the Bepcutmentu of justice shaH1 suspend aff iuiveoUigaliu
and proeedhings regarding such inatxc, cepL to the eaLen*L ±Cgdrd Li 0eL-
uusu 594(d, of Lid0 U, and except ilofo as such special prusecutL apJeea in
w ti L thtUh inVoHgaL 01i uroceedings may Le coLtnued Ly the DBepjuL-
iiiiL uf Jutwitke. Within thirty days after the first Special Prosecutor appointed
under this Act shall have assumed office, the Attorney General shall transfer to
the Office of Special Prosecutor the duties and responsibilities of the Public In-
tegrity Section in the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice.
(b) Nothing in this chapter shall prevent the Attorney General or the So-
licitor General from making a presentation as amicus curiae to any court as to
issues of law raised by any case or proceeding in which - the iSpecial pP-
rosecutor participates in air official capac as Special Prosecutor or any ap-
peal of such case or proceeding.
§ 598. Termination of effect of chapter
This chapter as amended shall cease to have effect five years after the date
of the enactment of this chapte, except that this chapter shall continue in ef-
fect with respect to then pending matters before the Special Prosecutor that in
the judgment of such the sSpecial Prosecutor require such continuation until
that Special Prosecutor deti-mines such matters have been completed.

